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E liter aliquā rōnem bonitatis. Tūc dicitur ꝙ illud quod eſt eligibilius propter ſe tantum eſt perfe/ctius/ꝗ̄ illud quod eſt eligibilius ꝓpter ſe ⁊ ꝓpter alterum: qꝛ illud eſt ſemꝑ vltimus finis. Dico vlte rius ꝙ illud quod eſt eligibile ꝓpter ſe et propter aliud nō diminuit a ſua bonitate ꝓpter hoc ꝙ eſt eligibile ꝓpter aliud: ⁊ ꝑ h̄ ſoluunt rōes. Et ponit

Cōcluſio rn̄ſalis: Illud quod eſt appetibile ꝓpter ſe tantū appetitu recto/eſt eligibilius illo qđ ꝓpter ſe/et ꝓpter aliud appetit: qꝛ quod eſt appetibile ꝓpter ſe ⁊ nūꝗ̄ ꝓpter aliud: ſiue hoc ſit ſimpliciter ſiue in aliquo genere eſt vltimus finis qui nihil exigit ipſo melius: ſed quod eſt appetibile ꝓpter aliud dato etiā ꝙ ſit appetibile ꝓpter ſe eſt vltimus finis.

¶ Sed forte felicitatē quidē et optimuꝫ dicere confeſſum quid videtur: deſideratur aūt manifeſtius quid eſt adhuc dici. Forte vtiqꝫ fiet hoc ſi ſumatur opus hominis ⁊c̄.

Queritur Utrū felicitas ſit quid ſufficiētiſſimū. ¶ Arguit ꝑmo ꝙ nō: quia per ſe ſufficientiſſimū facit vitā ſufficientē et nullo indigētē: ſꝫ felicitas nō eſt hmōi: igit. ¶ Arguit ſcđo: Felicitas cū vno minimo bono eſt ꝑfectior ſeipſa ſola: igit non eſt quid ſufficientiſſimū. In oppoſitū eſt ariſto. in textu. Pro cui⁹ ſolutiōe:

Prīo ſciēdū eſt/ ꝙ felicitas pōt capi dupliciter/ vt iā ſuperius

F viſum eſt: ⁊ tūc dico/ ꝙ felicitas ꝑmo modo: puta ꝓ ſtatu omniū bonoꝝ. ⁊c̄. eſt ꝑfectior ꝗ̄ felicitas ſecūdo mō/ puta ꝓ vno ſimplici bono quod homo poſſit habere. Scđo dico/ ꝙ ipā cū alio bono eſt ꝑfectior ſeipſa ſine illo bono ſumpta. i. aggregatum eſt melius ꝗ̄ vnū illoꝝ bonorū: qꝛ plura bona ſunt ſemper eligibiliora paucioꝛib⁹ bonis/ dūmodo in illis pluribus includant illa paucioꝛa. Sꝫ dubiū eſt: vtrū pecunie proſint aliquō ad vitā felicē. Rn̄det ꝙ bonuꝫ quod eſt grā melioris boni eſt ſemꝑ eligibile ꝗ̄diu ꝓdeſt illi bono: ſꝫ quādo nocet nō plus eſt eligibile: queādmodū pecunie nō in ſuper abundantia/ ſed in aliquo termino proſunt. Et ſi dicas/ ſi pecunie ꝓſint felicitati/ ſequeret ꝙ felicitas nō eēt ꝑ ſe ſufficiēs bonū. ¶ Ad hoc rn̄det ꝙ in ꝑma intentiōe ipā eſt ꝑ ſe ſufficiēs: qꝛ eſt vltim⁹ finis/ ⁊ tm̄ ꝓpter ſe: ſꝫ in ſcđa intētiōe indiget multis/ ⁊ ſic nō eſt ſufficiens. Un̄ felicitatis eſt ſubuenire indigentib⁹ parētib⁹/ liberis ⁊ toti cōmunitati: ſed iſtud nō pōt fieri ſine pecunia ſiue amicis. Et per hoc ſoluuntur argumenta.

Scđo ſciēdū eſt/ ꝙ ipſius felicitatis multe ſunt ꝓprietates. Prima eſt/ ꝙ ipſa eſt vltimus finis: ꝙ nō eſt intelligendū ſimpliciter: qꝛ deus eſt vltim⁹ finis: ſed debet intelligi inter bona humana: ita ꝙ inter bona humana ſeu inter bona que homini poſſunt cōuenire felicitas eſt meli⁹. Et ſi dicas/ felicitas hoīs eſt accidens: qꝛ non eſt niſi operatio ꝑ quā attingimus deū: ergo videt ꝙ hō qui eſt ꝑfectior ſua operatione ſit magis finis felicitatis ꝗ̄ ecōtra. ¶ Notandū eſt ꝙ qn̄cunqꝫ ſūt aliqua bona ordinata ad inuicem/ melius ſemꝑ dicit finis reſpectu alioꝛuꝫ. Un̄ inter oīa bona homini appoſita felicitas eſt melius bonū: cū hoc tamē ſtat ꝙ homo eſt finis felicitatis: felicitatē em̄ diligim⁹ ꝓpter noſmetipſos vt ipſa perficiamur. Scđa: ꝙ ipſa eſt ꝓpter ſeipſam eligibilis: qꝛ ipſa ex ſeipſa perfectio nobilis. Tertia: ꝙ ipſa nō eſt propter aliud eligibilis: qđ debet intelligi ꝑma intentiōe ⁊ inter bona hūana. Quarta: ꝙ omnia alia bona hūana: id eſt hoī appoſita ſunt ꝓpter ipſam eligibilia. Quinta: ꝙ ipſa eſt q̄d ꝑfectiſſimū: qꝛ a nullo hꝫ excellentiā. Sexta: ꝙ ipſa eſt q̄d delectabiliſſimū: qꝛ ꝑfectiſſima delectatio ſequit ipām felicitatē: qꝛ ipā operatio q̄ dicit felicitas eſt de obiecto nobis cōuenientiſſimo/ puta de ipſo deo. Un̄ de felicitate ꝑmo mō capta notū eſt/ ꝙ nō eſt bonū ſufficientiſſimū: ſed ſcđo modo capta dicitur bonū ſufficientiſſimū: qꝛ inter oīa bona homini appoſita ipſa eſt ſufficientiſſima. Et per hoc ſoluunt argumēta: Ideo ponitur: G

Cōcluſio rn̄ſalis: Felicitas eſt q̄d ſufficiētiſſimū: quia ad reddendū hominē bonū ⁊ optimū ipſa ſufficit: ⁊ ꝑ ipſam tantū bonū oſn̄ditur ꝙ hō nihil oīno reputat alia bona.

¶ Eſt autē ⁊ vita ipſoꝛū ſcđm ſeipſam delectabilis: delectari quidā em̄ aīaliū eſt: vnicuiqꝫ aūt eſt delectabile ad qđ ē amicus taliū: vt puta equ⁹ q̄dē amāti equū: ſpectaculū autē amanti ſpectaculū. Eodē autē modo ⁊ iuſta amanti iuſtū: ⁊ omino q̄ ſcđm virtutem amanti virtutē. Multis quidē igitur delectabilia aduerſant adinuicē: qꝛ nō naturalia ſunt ⁊c̄. H

Querit vtrū delectatiōes multoꝛū ſint ſibi inuicē cōtrarie. ¶ Arguit ꝑmo ꝙ nō: qꝛ oīs delectatio eſt quoddā bonū: ſed bonū nō cōtrariatur bono: igit. Arguit ſcđo ſic: Delectatio eſt ꝯria triſticie: ergo nō delectationi. Patꝫ qꝛ vni tantū eſt vnū cōtrariū. ¶ In oppoſitum arguit auctoꝛitate ariſto. in textu. Pro cui⁹ ſolutiōe

Primo ſciēdū eſt/ ꝙ paſſiones ſicut gaudiū delectatio/ triſticia/ doloꝛ ſolū inueniūtur in entibus cognitiuis ⁊ nō in rebus nō cognitiuis. Un̄ delectatio conſequit adeptionē cōuenietis ⁊ eius app̄henſionē: ⁊ triſticia/ vel doloꝛ cōſequitur fugam alicui⁹ qđ tn̄ euenit/ vel deſideriū alicuius quod nō euenit. Dico vlterius/ ꝙ proprie inueniūtur in appetitibus. Pro cuius declaratiōe eſt aduertēdum ꝙ triplex eſt appetitus: ſcꝫ rationalis/ qui nō eſt aliud ꝗ̄ voluntas. Alius eſt ſenſitiu⁹/ ⁊ alius naturalis. Unde appetitus ſenſitiuus/ poteſt capi tripliciter. Uno mō vt eſt derelictus ſue ꝓprie nature: et ſic eſt ſimilis appetitui brutoꝝ. Alio modo vt eſt regulatuu rōne: ⁊ ſic nunꝗ̄ obuiat rationi. Alio mō vt eſt vitioſe deprauatus. Un̄ appetitus deprauatus ſemꝑ obuiat recte rōni: ideo illud quod eſt delectabile appetitui ſenſitiuo deprauato vitio eſt cōtrariū/ vl̄ ſaltem diſcōueniens recte rationi: ⁊ hoc eſt quod volebat dicere Ariſtoteles ꝙ multoꝛū delectatiōes ſūt ꝯrie. Et quādo đr bonū nō ꝯtrariat bono. Dico ꝙ bona in ordine ad ea quoꝛū ſunt bona non ꝯtrariant: ſed ſcđm ſuas ꝓprias naturas bene ꝯtrariant. Et ꝑ hoc ſoluit ꝑmū argumentū.

Scđo ſciēdū eſt/ ꝙ delectabilia vitioſis multotiens ſunt cōtraria: vt auaro cōmutatio pecunie eſt ſibi delectabilis: ⁊ prodigo ꝯſumptio pecunie eſt ſibi delectabilis: ⁊ ſic delectationes eoꝛum ſunt cōtrarie/ ſaltem oꝛiginaliter: quia vitia eoꝛum ſunt contraria. Et per hoc ſoluitur ſcđm argumentum: licet em̄ de